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1. The Dance of Death was a genre of morality play and dates back to the fourteenth
century. Charles Herbermann & George Williamson, Dance of Death, in THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://newadvent.org/cathen/04617a.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2010). Designed in
response to the many plagues and epidemics that left thousands, if not millions, dead, OLE J.
BENEDICTOW, THE BLACK DEATH, 1346-1353, at 380-84 (2004), the Dance of Death was intended
to convey to audiences that all persons must die and therefore it was important to begin preparing
immediately to appear before God the Judge. See Herbermann & Williamson, supra.
2. THE DOORS, Five to One, on THE BEST OF THE DOORS (Elektra/Asylum Records 1985).
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project. I
would like to thank the South Carolina Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium
and for its generous hospitality during the Symposium. I would also like to thank the Law Review
for its assistance in the editing of this Essay. I would also like to thank Damoun Delaviz and Sarah
Rosenberg for their research assistance, and my colleagues, Sheri Johnson, Keir Weyble, and Emily
Paavola for reviewing drafts of the Symposium lecture and this Essay.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to discuss the Fourth Circuit's death-penalty
jurisprudence. Before tackling my assignment, let me begin with a story that will
serve as a disclaimer of sorts when I reach the substantive parts of this Essay.
I moved back to South Carolina in 1985. After graduating from Myrtle
Beach High School in 1973, I matriculated at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. After graduating from college, Yale Divinity School, and Yale Law
School, I accepted a clerkship with the Honorable Thomas A. Clark, a circuit
court judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Clerking for Judge Clark was a wonderful job. Most judicial clerks love the
judge for whom they clerk, and I was no exception. Additionally, 1984 to 1985
was an especially exciting year to be an Eleventh Circuit clerk because Judge
Clark was assigned to the three-judge panel or was a member of the en banc
court that issued opinions in McCleskey v. Kemp,3 Ford v. Wainwright,4 and
Hitchcock v. Wainwright,5 all three of which were ultimately heard by the
Supreme Court. It was also a very busy year because the execution machines in
Florida and Georgia were just entering high gear after experiencing a few early
bumps and hiccups that resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v.
Georgia,6 which "ushered in the 'modem' era of capital punishment. 7 As Judge
Clark's primary death and habeas clerk, I spent almost all of my time working on
capital habeas matters. The hours were long, and there were many late nights
spent poring over transcripts and briefs, but for a young lawyer it was a strange
combination of exhaustion, thrill, and fright. And so, when I came back to South
Carolina and joined a small firm in Charleston, I thought I knew a thing or two
about the death penalty and habeas corpus.
The truth is that I did not know as much as I thought I did, a fact which
many who know me will not find surprising. But, I did know more than most
lawyers in the state at that time because only a few capital cases had even
entered federal court by 1985, 8 and thus my one-year-judicial-clerk "crash"
course in capital habeas litigation made me-by default-something of an
expert. It is like the old saying, "In the land of the blind, the one eyed man is
King." So, when a lawyer I met in Charleston, Coming Ball Gibbs, asked me if I
would be willing to help with a capital habeas appeal pending in the Fourth
3. 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. 752 F.2d 526 (1 th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
5. 770 F.2d 1514(llth Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987).
6. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
7. John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers, " Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 939, 939 (2005). For a more detailed discussion of these events, see John H. Blume,
Twenty-Five Years of Death: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty Project on the "Modern" Era
of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REv. 285, 287-91 (2002).
8. See, e.g., Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's
denial of habeas corpus relief in favor of South Carolina authorities).
[VOL. 61 : 465
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Circuit, I enthusiastically signed on. The client was William Gibbs Hyman, and
the crime involved an ill-conceived robbery resulting in a drunken shootout and
one man dead. 9 Mr. Hyman, or Willie as we called him, was nearing the end of
his appeals, having been unsuccessful in the South Carolina state courts and,
until then, in the federal courts as well.10
To make a long story somewhat short, after the Fourth Circuit originally
granted sentencing relief but denied guilt-phase relief,11 both sides sought
certiorari review by the Supreme Court.12 The Court granted the petitions and
remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit for additional briefing and
argument. 13 On remand, the panel, in an opinion authored by Judge Butzner,
granted the writ of habeas corpus, finding Sandstrom error. Now for those
readers too young to know what a Sandstrom error is, or for the civil lawyers
who have not already stopped reading and do not really care what a Sandstrom
error is, I will just briefly say that it involves a burden-shifting instruction on an
element of the offense that in Sandstrom v. Montana,15 the Supreme Court held
violated the Due Process Clause because it relieved the State of its obligation to
prove the defendant guilty of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 6 The Fourth Circuit panel held that South Carolina's instruction that
"[m]alice is presumed or implied from the use of a deadly weapon" violated due17, ,
process. So, the "Great Writ" issued on Willie Hyman's behalf, and he was
awarded a new trial. Just to finish the story, especially because this is one of
the few capital cases entering federal habeas in the Fourth Circuit that has a
happy ending, at least from the death-sentenced inmate's point of view, a
favorable plea bargain was negotiated, and after serving approximately another
decade in prison, Mr. Hyman was granted parole. The last I heard, he was
working in the community and doing well.
And, I remember thinking, "That was relatively easy; capital habeas here
won't be so difficult." That was in 1987. Little did I know that it would be
another fifteen years before I won another case in the Fourth Circuit (at least one
that survived en banc review) or that my second victory, a Virginia case called
Williams v. True, 19 would make me, by a factor of 100%, the most successful
capital habeas attorney in Fourth Circuit history.
9. Hyman v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938, 939 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
10. See Hyman v. Aiken, 606 F. Supp. 1046 (D.S.C. 1985), rev'd, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir.
1987); State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E.2d 209 (1981).
11. 777 F.2d at 940-41.
12. 478 U.S. at 1016.
13. Id.
14. 824 F.2d at 1409, 1417 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1979)).
15. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
16. Id. at 524.
17. 824 F.2d at 1407, 1409 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 1417.
19. 39 F. App'x 830 (4th Cir. 2002).
2010]
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So, my interest in the Fourth Circuit's death-penalty jurisprudence is both
academic, as I have continued to study and write about the death penalty and
habeas corpus since I joined the faculty at Cornell in 1997, and experiential, as I
have litigated, and for the most part lost, a number of capital habeas cases in the
Fourth Circuit over the last twenty-four years.20 So, in case people reading this
Essay are asking whether there might be at least a bit of "sour grapes" involved
in my thinking about the topic, let me assure them that undoubtedly it is at least
partially the case.
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT BY THE NUMBERS
Because much of my academic work is empirical in nature, 21 let me begin
with the "numbers." In the modem era of capital punishment-the era that
begins with the United States Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia-there have been 276 total dispositions by the Fourth Circuit in capital
cases. 22 In 211 cases, the court affirmed the district court's decisions denying or
dismissing the writ of habeas corpus.23 In 6 cases, the court affirmed the district
court decision granting habeas relief to the death-sentenced inmate. 24 In 27 cases,
the court reversed the district court decision granting the writ of habeas corpus,
and in 8 cases the court reversed the district court decision denying the writ.
25
The en banc court has reversed grants of habeas relief by the district court or
panel on 8 occasions, and in 1 instance, it has reversed the denial of the writ of
20. I was lead counsel or co-counsel for the capital habeas petitioner in the following
unsuccessful cases: Gardner v. Ozmint, 511 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d
847 (4th Cir. 2003), modified, 357 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2004); Drayton v. Moore, 168 F.3d 481 (4th
Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Moore, 164 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 1998); Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749 (4th
Cir. 1998); Atkins v. Moore, 139 F.3d 887 (4th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808 (4th Cir.
1998); Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998); Plath v. Moore, 130 F.3d 595 (4th Cir.
1997); Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1997); Middleton v. Evatt, 77 F.3d 469 (4th Cir.
1996); Spann v. Martin, 963 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1992); Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.
1990); Woomer v. Aiken, 905 F.2d 1533 (4th Cir. 1990); and Roach v. Aiken, 781 F.2d 379 (4th Cir.
1986).
21. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its
Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REv. 625 (2009) (discussing empirical data on mental
retardation claims made by capital-punishment defendants); John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the
Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 477 (2008) (discussing empirical data on testimony by innocent defendants); John
Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 165 (2004) [hereinafter Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial
Composition] (using empirical data on murder demographics to explain death row demographics);
John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection:
An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 465, 470 (1999) (using empirical data to explain the
relationship "among judicial elections, states' death-obtaining rates, and judicial review of capital
cases").
22. See infra Appendix A.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
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habeas corpus to a death-sentenced inmate. 26 A table capturing these findings is
set forth below:
FIGURE 1
276 211 6 8 27 8 1 15
The most significant thing, in my view, that can be gleaned from these
numbers is the very low success rate that death-sentenced inmates have in capital
habeas cases in the Fourth Circuit. In the thirty-three years that the new and
supposedly improved death penalty has been in effect, capital habeas petitioners
in the Fourth Circuit have prevailed in only about 6.2% of the cases.27 Given that
the overall success rate of death-sentenced inmates in federal habeas corpus
cases in all circuits over the same time period is closer to 40%,28 there is a
significant disparity in outcomes. Furthermore, the 6.2% success rate figure
includes procedural wins-instances where the petitioner "wins" the right to an
evidentiary hearing. If one considers just cases where the writ is "granted"
cases where the capital habeas petitioner is awarded a new trial as to guilt or
punishment-the success rate falls to approximately 3.3%.
Now, some may contend that looking at the entire modem era of capital
punishment (1976 to the present) is not appropriate because some states may
have had large systemic problems that skewed the success rates. I disagree with
26. See id.
27. See Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2009); Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220 (4th
Cir. 2008); Walker v. Kelly, 195 F. App'x 169 (4th Cir. 2006); Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567 (4th
Cir. 2006); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319 (4th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (per curiam); Brown v. Lee, 319 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2003); Williams v. True, 39 F.
App'x 830 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2002); Skipper v.
French, 130 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 1997); Thomas-Bey v. Nuth, Nos. 95-4000, 95-4001, 1995 WL
561296 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1995) (per curiam); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004); Washington v. Murray, 952 F.2d 1472 (4th Cir.
1991); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988); Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th
Cir. 1988); Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987); Clark v. Townley, 791 F.2d 925 (4th
Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). Note that this percentage does not include cases where the
en banc court vacated the district court or panel's decision to grant relief.
28. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 9 (2002) (considering the success
rates of twenty-eight states), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.
2010]
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any such assertion for several reasons. First, looking at success rates over a
thirty-three year period should account for any such state-specific systemic
disparities. Second, several of the states in the Fourth Circuit had their own
systemic issues.29 Third, for the most part, state courts address systemic issues
after the United States Supreme Court identifies the constitutional defect.3 °
Nevertheless, I decided to look at the more recent cases. If one examines just the
capital habeas decisions issued by the Fourth Circuit during the last five years,
things more or less stayed the same. One death-sentenced inmate was afforded
31habeas relief in the Fourth Circuit. In comparison, other large circuits have
much higher figures over the same period of time: there were seven successful
cases in the Third Circuit,32 eleven in the Fifth Circuit,33 twenty-two in the Sixth
Circuit,34 and seventeen in the Ninth Circuit.35 Even if one examines decisions
29. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990) (finding North Carolina
unanimity requirement, which prevented the jury from considering "any mitigating factor that [it
did] not unanimously find," unconstitutional); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988)
(concluding that Maryland death penalty instruction was unconstitutional by requiring jurors to
agree unanimously as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance).
30. For example, in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), the United States Supreme
Court concluded that South Carolina's exclusion of evidence that a capital defendant would not be
dangerous in prison violated the Eighth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Id. at 8. The South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently granted a number of
death-sentenced inmates new sentencing trials because of Skipper. See, e.g., Chaffee v. State, 294
S.C. 88, 91-92, 362 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1987) (granting new sentencing trial to death-sentenced
inmate in light of Court's decision in Skipper); State v. Patterson, 290 S.C. 523, 529, 533, 351
S.E.2d 853, 856, 858 (1986) (same); State v. Matthews, 291 S.C. 339, 348-49, 353 S.E.2d 444, 450
(1986) (same).
31. See Gray, 529 F.3d at 242.
32. See Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 2009); Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70,
72 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 619 (2009); Bond v. Beard,
539 F.3d 256, 292 (3d Cir. 2008); Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 304 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated,
No. 08-652, 2010 WL 154862, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010); Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 119 (3d
Cir. 2008); Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 2006); Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452,
453 (3d Cir. 2005).
33. See Adams v. Quarterman, 324 F. App'x 340, 356 (5th Cir. 2009); Haynes v.
Quarterman, 561 F.3d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 2009), rev'dsub nom. Thaler v. Haynes, No. 09-273, 2010
WL 596511, at *4 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2010); Walbey v. Quarterman, 309 F. App'x 795, 806 (5th Cir.
2009); Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2009); Fratta v. Quarterman, 536 F.3d 485,
488 (5th Cir. 2008); Koon v. Cain, No. 07-70018, 2008 WL 1924217, at *1 (5th Cir. May 1, 2008);
Mines v. Quarterman, 267 F. App'x 356, 362 (5th Cir. 2008); Tassin v. Cain, 517 F.3d 770, 772,
781 (5th Cir. 2008); Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 448 (5th Cir. 2007); Draughon v. Dretke,
427 F.3d 286, 297 (5th Cir. 2005); Brooks v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 430, 431 (5th Cir. 2005).
34. See Awkal v. Mitchell, 559 F.3d 456, 457 (6th Cir. 2009), reh 'g en bane granted, No. 01-
4278, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 17145, at *1 (6th Cir. July 29, 2009); Van Hook v. Anderson, 560
F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2009), rev'dper curiam sub nom. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13, 15
(2009); Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 594 (6th Cir. 2008); Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 513
(6th Cir. 2008); D'Ambrosio v. Bagley, 527 F.3d 489, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2008); Bies v. Bagley, 519
F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Bobby v. Bies, 129 S. Ct. 2145, 2149 (2009); Spisak
v. Hudson, 512 F.3d 852, 853 (6th Cir. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 680
(2010); Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 919 (6th Cir. 2007); Garner v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 394,
397 (6th Cir. 2007), rev'd en bane, 557 F.3d 257, 258 (6th Cir. 2009); Richey v. Bradshaw, 498
[VOL. 61 : 465
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issued over the last ten years, one would find that there are a total of three
36
successful cases in the Fourth Circuit. Thus, regardless of the time period
examined, the success rates in the Fourth Circuit are quite low.
There are several other numbers, other than the low overall relief rate for
death-sentenced inmates, which should be briefly mentioned. The overwhelming
majority of dispositions in the Fourth Circuit (209 of 276) are panel decisions
affirming the denial of habeas relief.37 That is not surprising given the deference
generally given by circuit courts to district court conclusions (especially factual
findings) and the high affirmance rate in general in all circuits in all cases. 38 But
the number of decisions issued by the Fourth Circuit reversing a district court
grant of relief exceeds, by more than a threefold factor, the number of decisions
reversing a district court denial of relief. On twenty-seven occasions, a panel has
reversed a district court's decision in favor of a death-sentenced inmate;39 in only
F.3d 344, 364 (6th Cir. 2007); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 2007); Davis v.
Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 781 (6th Cir. 2007); Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 475 (6th Cir. 2006);
Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F.3d 684, 708 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated mem. sub nom. Hudson v. Spisak,
552 U.S. 945, 945-46 (2007); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 817 (6th Cir. 2006); Getsy v.
Mitchell, 456 F.3d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 2007);
Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 564, 587 (6th Cir. 2006); Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 700
(6th Cir. 2006); Van Hook v. Anderson, 444 F.3d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 2006), rev 'den bane, 488 F.3d
411, 428 (6th Cir. 2007); Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 431 (6th Cir. 2006); White v.
Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2005); Madrigal v. Bagley, 413 F.3d 548, 549 (6th Cir.
2005).
35. See Sechrest v. Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2008); Styers v. Schriro, 547
F.3d 1026, 1036 (9th Cir. 2008); McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008); Duncan
v. Ornoski, 528 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2008); Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 834, 837 (9th
Cir. 2008), rev'dper curiam sub nom. Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 384 (2009); Correll v.
Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 956 (9th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.
2008); Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Comer v. Schriro,
480 F.3d 960, 993 (9th Cir. 2007); Lankford v. Arave, 468 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 2006); Frierson
v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2006); Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.
2006); Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 945 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated in part mem. 552 U.S. 117,
118-19 (2008); Brown v. Lambert, 451 F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2006), rev'd sub nom. Uttecht v.
Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 5 (2007); Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 917 (9th Cir. 2006); Daniels v.
Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005); Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir.
2005).
36. See Gray, 529 F.3d at 242; Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per
curiam); Williams v. True, 39 F. App'x 830, 831 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
37. See infra Appendix A.
38. Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the
"Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 357, 358
(2005) (reporting a 90% affirmance rate by the federal courts of appeals).
39. See Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700 (4th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d
478 (4th Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 2003); Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288
F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Booth-El v. Nuth,
288 F.3d 571 (4th Cir. 2002); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2001); Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d
470 (4th Cir. 2000); Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1999), aff'd, 530 U.S. 156
(2000); Colvin-El v. Nuth, Nos. 98-27, 98-29, 1999 WL 436776 (4th Cir. June 17, 1999); Williams
v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Strickler v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29,
97-30, 1998 WL 340420 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998) (per curiam); Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208 (4th
2010]
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eight instances, however, has the court reversed a decision denying the writ of
habeas corpus.4 ° When the en banc cases are added, the numbers go to thirty
cases reversing a district court decision in the capital petitioner's favor,41 with
only nine reversing a denial of relief.42 Thus the relatively high reversal rate in
cases where the inmate prevailed in the district court is a significant factor
driving down the overall relief rate.
Second, as should be clear from the figures reported above, the en banc
outcomes are also stark. The Fourth Circuirt has heard en banc ten capital habeas
cases, nine of which were decided against the inmate either on the merits or on
procedural grounds43 and only one of which resulted in a decision favorable to
the inmate. The majority of these cases involved panel decisions that were
favorable to the capital habeas petitioner.45 Thus, the en banc court has been
Cir. 1998); Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir. 1997); Pope v. Netherland, 113 F.3d 1364 (4th
Cir. 1997); Stout v. Netherland, Nos. 95-4008, 95-4007, 1996 WL 496601 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1996)
(per curiam); Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996); Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279
(4th Cir. 1995); Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Tuggle v.
Netherland, 516 U.S. 10 (1995); Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995); Gray v.
Thompson, 58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1995); Noland v. Dixon, No. 93-4011, 1995 WL 253149 (4th Cir.
May 1, 1995) (per curiam); Edmonds v. Thompson, Nos. 92-4011, 92-4012, 1994 WL 47745 (4th
Cir. Feb. 16, 1994) (per curiam); Peterson v. Murray, 949 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam);
Boggs v. Bair, 892 F.2d 1193 (4th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1989);
Clanton v. Bair, 826 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1987); Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
40. See Gray, 529 F.3d 220; Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 2004), rev'd en
banc, 397 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005); Allen v. Lee, 319 F.3d 645 (4th Cir. 2003), rev 'den banc, 366
F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2004); Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2000), rev'den banc, 240 F.3d
348 (4th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992),
abrogated by Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1988); Hyman v. Aiken, 824 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1987); Hyman v. Aiken, 777 F.2d 938 (4th Cir.
1985), vacatedmem. 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
41. See Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); O'Dell v. Netherland, 95
F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); cases
cited supra note 39.
42. See Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2004) (en bane) (per curiam); cases cited supra
note 40.
43. Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Humphries v. Ozmint, 397
F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Mickens
v. Taylor, 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en bane), aff'd, 535 U.S. 162 (2002); Gilbert v. Moore, 134
F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc);
Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th
Cir. 1996) (en banc); Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994) (en bane).
44. See Allen, 366 F.3d 319.
45. See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, 407 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2005) (reversing lower court's
decision and remanding case for evidentiary hearing), rev 'den banc 440 F.3d 160 (vacating panel's
decision and affirming lower court's decision to deny the writ); Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d
266, 278 (4th Cir. 2004) (granting writ for purposes of resentencing), rev'd en banc, 397 F.3d at 209
(vacating panel's decision and affirming lower court's dismissal of defendant's petition); Mickens
v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 218 (4th Cir. 2000) (granting writ unless State retries defendant), rev 'den
banc, 240 F.3d at 364 (denying defendant's petition for habeas relief); Gilbert v. Moore, 121 F.3d
144, 149 (4th Cir. 1997) (affirming lower court's grant of writ), rev'd en banc, 134 F.3d at 659
(reversing lower court's grant of writ); Mackall v. Murray, 109 F.3d 957, 964 (4th Cir. 1997)
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active in eliminating panel decisions in the inmate's favor.46 Stepping back and
looking at the larger picture, one can see the following: (1) of the total number of
habeas cases that make it to the Fourth Circuit, there are a relatively small
number of victories for death-sentenced inmates; (2) of the habeas cases in
which the Fourth Circuit reverses a district court, the court reverses favorable
district court decisions in capital habeas cases more than 75% of the time; and
(3) of the cases where a death-sentenced inmate does prevail before a three-judge
panel, the en banc court has been active in vacating those decisions.
III. EXPLAINING THE "NUMBERS"
The numbers game can be a tricky business. Mark Twain once said, "There
are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics. 47 Thus, it is true that
there are potentially a number of reasons for the very low success rate in capital
habeas cases in the Fourth Circuit. Next, I will explore several of the possible
explanations.
One explanation could be that the state appellate courts in the Fourth Circuit
do a more rigorous job of screening cases on direct appeal and in state post
conviction, and thus, the pool of cases entering federal habeas may be different.
But that does not appear to be true. The Virginia Supreme Court, for example,
has an even lower reversal rate in capital cases than does the Fourth Circuit.48
There has been some variability in the reversal rates of the North Carolina and
South Carolina Supreme Courts in capital cases.49 But overall, any objective
observer would reject the assertion that the state courts in the Fourth Circuit are
particularly hospitable to death-row appellants, and as just discussed, the reversal
rates bear that out. Thus, rigorous review of capital cases by the state courts does
not explain the low success rates of capital habeas petitioners in the Fourth
Circuit.
Another possible explanation is that the trial-level capital defense bar is
better in the Fourth Circuit than in other jurisdictions. Because many death-row
inmates win on some form of ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal
(remanding case to lower court for hearing on effectiveness of defendant's habeas counsel), rev'd en
banc sub nom. Mackall v. Angelone, 131 F.3d at 451 (vacating panel's decision and affirming lower
court's dismissal of defendant's petition); Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 680 (4th Cir. 1993)
(affirming lower court's decision to grant writ), rev'd en banc, 14 F.3d at 982 (reversing lower
court's decision to grant writ).
46. Again, in the interest of full disclosure, let me give another brief disclaimer in the sour
grapes vein. I may be the only lawyer in capital habeas history who represented a client who was
successful in the district court, who was successful (in a unanimous decision) before a three-judge
panel, and then who had relief taken away by the en banc court in a unanimous decision. See
Gilbert, 134 F.3d 642.
47. Mark Twain, Chapters from My Autobiography-XX, N. AM. REv., July 5, 1907, at 465,
471, reprinted in MARK TwAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1996).
48. See Blume & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 486 tbl.2.
49. See id.
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court, maybe the lawyers are better. This becomes more of a possibility to
explore when one looks at the number of ineffective assistance of counsel wins
in capital cases. There have been three successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claims in thirty-three years in the Fourth Circuit, and they actually do
balance out at one a decade. 50 This is in stark contrast to the number of
ineffective assistance of counsel wins in other federal courts of appeals.51
Admittedly, there is some subjectivity in attempting to determine what
constitutes a good defense and a good capital defense lawyer. But from a funding
perspective, until the mid-1990s, there was virtually no funding in South
Carolina at the trial level for experts or investigators, and attorney compensation
was so low that lawyers frequently did not submit vouchers for attorneys' fees.
Things became better after the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Bailey v. State,52 but I doubt capital trial lawyers would say they believe that
South Carolina is the death penalty "promised land." The same holds true, in
somewhat varying degrees, in Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. The
standards for appointment of trial counsel in the Fourth Circuit states are not
more rigorous than the standards in other jurisdictions, and there are not any
special continuing legal education or training requirements for appointment at
the capital trial level. In recent years, most Fourth Circuit states, including South53
Carolina, have created certification programs for capital-case counsel as well as
statewide capital defender offices, and the payoff has been immediate. The
number of death sentences imposed in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina
has plummeted, and the number of new sentences in South Carolina has also
50. See Gray v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2008); Thomas-Bey v. Nuth, Nos. 95-
4000, 95-4001, 1995 WL 561296, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1995) (per curiam); Clark v. Townley,
791 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). On one occasion, a panel of the Fourth
Circuit granted relief to a petitioner based on ineffective assistance of counsel, but the en bane court
vacated the decision and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the petition. See Humphries, 366
F.3d at 278 (granting writ for purposes of resentencing), rev'd en banc, 397 F.3d at 209 (vacating
panel's decision and affirming lower court's dismissal of defendant's petition).
51. See John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Deja Vu All Over Again": Williams
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach
to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 162 (2007); Kenneth Williams, Does
Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 1459, 1478 (2009).
52. 309 S.C. 455, 464, 424 S.E.2d 503, 508 (1992) (holding that attorneys' hourly rates and
cap set by state law does not create an absolute ceiling on attorney compensation in capital cases but
simply limits the amount of state funding allocated and explaining that counties must supplement
attorney compensation "as required in a given case").
53. See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-3-26(F) (2003) ("The Supreme Court shall promulgate
guidelines on the expertise and qualifications necessary for attorneys to be certified as competent to
handle death penalty cases.").
54. See, e.g., The North Carolina Court System, Office of Indigent Defense Services,
http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/ids/ (follow "IDS Office" hyperlink; then follow "What is IDS?"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (noting that the Office of Indigent Defense Services works
closely with the Office of the Capital Defender); Virginia Indigent Defense Commission,
http://www.publicdefender.state.va.us (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 13, 2010)
(setting forth the Virginia Capital Defender Offices).
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55decreased. The statewide capital defender in South Carolina recently obtained a
56
significant victory in a hard fought Charleston County case. But, that case and
those developments are all too recent to effect the cases that have proceeded into
federal court. So, I do not think, to quote my favorite lawyer, Vinny, the
protaganist in one of the best lawyer movies of all time, My Cousin Vinny, that
the better counsel argument "holds water."
There are some other explanations to consider. For example, it is possible
that the Fourth Circuit states have narrower capital-sentencing statutes that
restrict the pool of death-eligible cases, thus helping sort out the death wheat
from the death chaff. That might have some influence in Virginia, which has a
trigger-man rule, where only the actual killer can get the death penalty in a
codefendant or multiple-defendant case.58 But most other states in the Fourth
Circuit have very broad capital-murder schemes that make almost any murder
death eligible. 9 Moreover, prosecutors do not appear to exercise more discretion
in their death-seeking behavior. In Fourth Circuit states, the number of death
sentences obtained in relationship to the number of murders is more or less
average when compared to death-penalty states in other circuits. Or maybe it is
because more of the judges on the Fourth Circuit have been state or federal
prosecutors or state court judges than in other circuits? But that also does not
appear to be the case. Many Fourth Circuit judges have that type of experience, 61
but so do many judges on other federal courts of appeal. It is a common judicial
career path.
55. See Death Penalty Information Center, Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 to
2008, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Mar.
13, 2010); see also DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE DEATH PENALTY IN 2009: YEAR END
REPORT 1 (2009), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf ("The drop
in death sentences was particularly pronounced in... Virginia.").
56. Robert Behre, Mistrial Declared in Capital Case, THE POST & COURIER, Sept. 30, 2009,
at Al.
57. MY COUSIN VINNY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992).
58. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-18, -31 (2008).
59. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (listing
fifteen aggravating circumstances); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (2009) (listing eleven
aggravating circumstances); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a) (2003 & Supp. 2009) (listing twenty-
one aggravating circumstances); see also John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South
Carolina's Return to the Unconstitutional, Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-
Furman Era, 4 CHARLESTON L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing that recent South Carolina
expansion of aggravating factors that make a murder death eligible creates a standard in the state
that almost all murder cases can meet). But see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-2 (LexisNexis 2005)
(abolishing the death penalty).
60. See Blume et al., Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, supra
note 21, at 172 tbl.1 (providing a table and an explanation of the death-sentence rates for the thirty-
one states that have ten death-row inmates or more).
61. For example, Chief Judge Traxler was both a state court prosecutor and a state court
judge. Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/public/
home.nsf/hisj (follow "T" hyperlink; then follow "Traxler, William Byrd Jr." hyperlink) (last visited
Mar. 13, 2010).
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IV. A QUALITATIVE EXPLANATION FOR WHY CAPITAL HABEAS PETITIONERS
LOSE
The bottom line is that the low success rates of capital habeas petitioners can
not be explained by any clear, objective criteria. Regardless, I do not think this is
an unsolvable riddle. Although not necessarily empirically provable, I will
attempt to demonstrate in the remainder of this Essay that the resounding
rejection of virtually all claims raised by capital habeas petitioners is primarily
attributable to the fact that the circuit utilizes a very deferential approach-more
deferential and hands-off than other circuits-to the decisions of state courts, to
the application of state procedural rules, and to the actions of state prosecutors
and capital trial counsel. The court almost always resolves the benefit of the
doubt against the inmate, and it is willing to engage in a determined search for
reasons justifying its decision to leave the state court death verdict intact. Let me
now endeavor to offer evidence in support of my theory.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
I will begin by addressing the court's treatment of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims. This is the most common claim asserted by capital habeas
62petitioners and probably, in most circuits, is the most common successful claim
63leading to a new trial or sentencing hearing. To establish entitlement to habeas
relief, a death-sentenced inmate must demonstrate both that trial counsel's
performance was "deficient" and that counsel's deficient performance was
64prejudicial. The Supreme Court has defined deficient performance as conduct
that "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 65 To satisfy the
prejudice requirement, the defendant must demonstrate that "there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different."
66
As for the performance prong, the Fourth Circuit has, in many cases,
credited facially "strategic" reasons offered by trial counsel for their actions
without subjecting such actions to meaningful scrutiny. In Kevin Wiggins's case,
for example, his trial counsel justified the failure to present evidence of
Wiggins's low intellectual functioning and history of sexual abuse on the basis
that it was inconsistent with the theory that Wiggins was not the principal actor
62. See David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home:
What Civil Procedure Can Teach Criminal Procedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 723 n.151
(2006).
63. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
64. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
65. Id. at 687-88.
66. Id. at 694.
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in the murder.67 Counsel testified that, given this strategy, she elected not to
present the mitigating evidence of Wiggins's intellectual impairments and social
history in order to avoid a "shotgun approach" to the sentencing phase. 68 The
panel majority credited that reason.69 But, as the Supreme Court pointed out in
its decision reversing the Fourth Circuit, counsel did not, in fact, focus
exclusively on Wiggins not being the actual killer.70 Rather counsel went with a
weak, "halfhearted" shotgun approach.71 This type of reversal is not a one-time
occurrence. 72 Embracing facially plausible strategic reasons that are without
support in the record has happened in a number of cases. For instance, in
Drayton v. Moore,73 counsel testified in postconviction proceedings that he did
not present evidence of Drayton's mental state, hypoglycemia, or substance
abuse because he wanted to portray Drayton in a "positive light., 74 Under all
circumstances, failing to present mitigation evidence establishing that the client
had neurological damage in order to focus on "good guy" evidence would be a
risky gamble, especially if the same jury has just found the defendant guilty of
murder. But the real rub in Drayton's case is that counsel did not even make such
portrayal. He presented no evidence of Drayton's good character, and to rub salt
in the wound, he attacked Drayton's character in his penalty phase summation.75
Trial counsel described his client as someone who was "probably as far down the
rung of our society as we can get" and someone who "had every opportunity to
climb up that ladder" but who chose not to do it.7 6 Counsel also decribed
Drayton as "far from [being] a nice . . . fellow" and as someone whose "true
peers" were not the jurors but "people who have problems with the law. ' 7 7 In
sum, the Fourth Circuit's overall approach to assessing whether counsel's
performance was constitutionally adequate is highly deferential, and virtually
anything trial counsel presents as a strategic reason will be credited even in the
face of evidence in the record to the contrary.
67. See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 635, 642-43 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
68. Id. at 643.
69. Id. ("The district court failed to heed this admonition [to credit plausible strategic
judgments] .... The Maryland Court of Appeals found his judgment sound on the basis of the
factual record before it, and even if we were of opinion that the Maryland Court's decision was in
error, we cannot say that it was unreasonable.").
70. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526.
71. Id. (citing Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1, 15 (Md. 1999)).
72. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-99 (2000) (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's
decision finding that trial counsel's performance was reasonable and not prejudicial), rev'g 163
F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998).
73. No. 98-18, 1999 WL 10073 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999).
74. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death: Factual Misrepresentations in Fourth
Circuit Capital Cases, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1105, 1116 (2006).
76. Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 1118 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In evaluating (and rejecting) the prejudice prong of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, the Fourth Circuit has taken a different track. Many ineffective
assistance of counsel claims turn on whether counsel failed to investigate,
develop, and present mitigation evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial.78
The court has frequently dispensed with the prejudice prong using a creation of
its own doctrine, which is sometimes referred to as the "double-edged sword"
doctrine. 79 When examining the mitigation evidence that counsel did not present,
the court is prone to rule that, while it is true there was a mitigating aspect to the
evidence-evidence that might lead a juror to determine that life imprisonment
rather than the death penalty was the appropriate punishment-some jurors
might have deemed the evidence aggravating, making the evidence a reason to
sentence the defendant to death.80 Thus, because it is not clear how the jury
would evaluate the unpresented mitigation evidence, the court reasons that
counsel's failure to do so did not affect the outcome.81 Again, Kevin Wiggins's
case is instructive. Wiggins's federal habeas counsel alleged that the trial counsel
should have presented information that Wiggins was very low functioning
intellectually and that he was physically and sexually abused as a child.8' The
panel rejected Wiggins's argument, reasoning that "not all of the available social
history evidence is unequivocally mitigating. Here, the jury could just as easily
have viewed Wiggins' childhood and limited mental capacity as an indicator of
future lawlessness. 8 3 A seven-to-two majority of the Supreme Court, however,
found the evidence to be sufficiently mitigating so as to create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome.
8 4
There are many, many instances of the Fourth Circuit's use of the double-
edged sword doctrine in capital habeas cases 8 5 To discuss just briefly one other
example, in J.D. Gleaton's case, the unpresented mitigation evidence involved
evidence of Gleaton's extreme poverty and deprivation during childhood, brain
damage from exposure to neurotoxins, and a drug habit that developed after he
was in a near fatal car wreck, in which he broke his neck and had multiple holes
86drilled in his skull to which a "halo" neck brace was attached . His claim ran
aground on the circuit's rocky prejudice shoals because, "[a]lthough evidence
that a defendant suffers from a mental impairment or has abused drugs or
78. See Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't.- The Use of Mitigation
Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359, 360-61 (1997).
79. See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit's "'Double-Edged
Sword": Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the
Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REv. 1480, 1480-81 (1999).
80. See id.
81. Id. at 1497.
82. See Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
83. Id. at 642.
84. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537.
85. See Blume & Johnson, supra note 79, at 1497 (citing cases).
86. Id. at 1491-94.
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narcotics may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime, this evidence is a
two-edged sword.,8 7 Under this doctrine, the court almost necessarily rejects
penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims.88
The combination of the court's extreme deference to purported strategic
reasons when assessing counsel's competence and its willingness to conclude
that the evidence may be double-edged when evaluating prejudice is, in most
cases, literally lethal. 9 Furthermore, it explains why the circuit has found
counsel to have provided representation that fell below the Sixth Amendment's
quite low bar on only three occasions over the last thirty-three years,90 and it
shows why the majority of favorable district court decisions, many of which
were based on findings that trial counsel's representation did not satisfy the Sixth
Amendment, were reversed on appeal by a panel or the en banc court.
B. Prosecutorial Withholding of Exculpatory Evidence
Another common claim in capital habeas litigation is that the prosecution's
failure to disclose exculpatory information violated the petitioner's rights under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To prevail on what is
commonly called a Brady claim, which is based on the Supreme Court's decision
in Brady v. Maryland,93 a habeas petitioner must prove three things: (1) that the
prosecution withheld information; (2) that the information was favorable to the
defense; and (3) that the information was "material"--that is, that "there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.,
94
87. Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642, 655 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Gleaton was a
codefendant in Gilbert. Id. at 645.
88. See Blume & Johnson, supra note 79, at 1497.
89. See id.
90. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Branker, 517 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2008) (reversing lower
court's grant of habeas relief, which was based on ineffective assistance of counsel reasoning);
Williams v. Ozmint, 494 F.3d 478, 481 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); Wilson v. Ozmint, 352 F.3d 847,
857 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2002) (same), rev'd
sub nom. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 696 (4th Cir. 2001)
(same); Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860, 866 (4th Cir. 1998) (same), rev'd, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
92. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 675-76 (2004) (holding that a death-sentenced
inmate was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding as a result of the prosecution's failure to
provide the defense with favorable information); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22 (1995)
("Because the net effect of the evidence withheld by the State in this case raises a reasonable
probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result, Kyles is entitled to a new
trial.").
93. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
94. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 682 (1985).
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The Fourth Circuit has, in general, construed all three elements of the due
process standard in a parsimonious manner.95 Moreover, it has also, in a manner
similar to the double-edged sword doctrine adopted and used by the circuit in the
ineffective assistance of counsel context, created a "gloss" on the relevant legal
standard for adjudicating withholding of exculpatory information claims. Thus,
even if the habeas petitioner proves that the prosecution did not disclose
exculpatory information, the claim will still fail if the court concludes that the
defendant-had he acted in a diligent manner-could have reasonably
discovered the evidence. For example, in Barnes v. Thompson,96 the district
court found that a Virginia death-row inmate was entitled to a new sentencing
trial because the prosecution failed to disclose that a gun was found on the
victim's body.97 The district court judge, a former prosecutor himself, deemed
this to be exculpatory in light of the defense's theory of the case. 98 The Fourth
Circuit reversed on the basis that Barnes's trial counsel was not diligent in
discovering this information. 99 The court observed that at the codefendant's trial,
which took place two weeks prior to Barnes's trial, a police officer admitted that
the victim was armed. 100 Counsel was not diligent, the court found, because he
did not attend the codefendant's trial or read transcripts from it. 10 1 The court has
invoked the due diligence exception to the Brady rule elsewhere as well.
10 2
C. Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges
Racial discrimination and the death penalty have a long, common history,
especially in the South.103 And issues of race arise in capital litigation in avariety of contexts.104 But probably the most common race issue that arises
95. See, e.g., Johnson v. Moore, Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL 708691, at *12 (4th Cir.
Sept. 24, 1998) (finding that the prosecution's failure to disclose that its primary witness recanted
her testimony before Johnson's second trial did not violate due process).
96. 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1995).
97. Id. at 973-74.
98. See id. at 973.
99. See id. at 972, 976-77.
100. Id. at 976.
101. Id. at 977.
102. See, e.g., Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1355 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that if the
defendant had "undertaken a 'reasonable and diligent' investigation," he would have uncovered the
undisclosed evidence).
103. See generally John H. Blume et al., Post-McClesky Racial Discrimination Claims in
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1771 (1998) (discussing the history of racial discrimination
claims in capital cases in southern states as well as states from other parts of the United States).
104. See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 312 (1987) (rejecting defendant's
Eighth Amendment challenge to his death sentence but acknowledging that the statistical evidence
indicates racial discrepanices in the capital sentencing context); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35-
37 (1986) (holding that the capital defendant was entitled to inquire on voir dire about a juror's
racial attitudes given the "unique opportunity for racial prejudice" to infect the capital sentencing
decision); State v. Bennett, 369 S.C. 219, 232, 632 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2006) (rejecting a death-
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involves challenges to the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges. ° 5 The
issue is commonly referred to as the Batson issue, again based on the seminal
Supreme Court case establishing the right.10 6 When asserting a Batson violation,
death-sentenced inmates, particularly inmates of color, allege that the
prosecution exercised its peremptory strikes to exclude jurors on the basis of
race, gender, or national origin. 107 To be successful, the defendant must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the State's use of its peremptory
challenges. If the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the prosecution to offer a race-neutral reason for the challenge.109 If the
prosecution does so, the trial court must determine whether the proffered race-
neutral reason was pretextual. 110
In assessing Batson claims, the Fourth Circuit, in addition to the deference it
gives to prosecutors' stated reasons for challenging minority jurors, has
embraced a unique approach that allows it to dismiss a death-sentenced inmate's
arguments more easily. In Howard v. Moore,"' for example, a majority of the en
banc court rejected Howard's comparative juror analysis agrument-that the
prosecution did not strike white jurors who gave similar answers to the black
jurors that the prosecution struck-on the basis that the challenges could have
been justified by differences in the jurors' demeanors, facial expressions, etc.1 12
But the problem was that the prosecutor in Howard never said anything about
the jurors' demeanor at the time the prosecutor challenged the jurors. Thus,
the court adopted what is in effect a "hypothetical" demeanor rule. It does not
matter if a prosecutor in fact relied on a juror's demeanor; rather, it only matters
that the prosecutor could have decided to challenge a juror based on demeanor.
sentenced inmate's argument that referring to an African-American defendant as "King Kong" was
an appeal to racial bias).
105. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 474 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,
235 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 326 (2003); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 413
(1991).
106. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 98 (1986) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a
new trial if the prosecution uses its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner).
107. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text. Nationally, there have been several
documented instances of prosecutors being trained to challenge minority jurors, particularly
African-American jurors, on the assumption that those jurors will be much more reluctant to impose
the death penalty, particularly on a minority defendant. See, e.g., Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 264 (citing
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 334-45) (noting the existence of a training manual used by Dallas District
Attorney's Office advising prosecutors to peremptorily challenge minority jurors); Wilson v. Beard,
426 F.3d 653, 655 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that a Batson violation occurred where the prosecutor in
the case, Jack McMahon, discussed on a training videotape his method of jury selection, which
included strategically using peremptory challenges to prevent African-Americans from serving on
juries).
108. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
109. Id. at 97.
110. Id. at 98.
111. 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
112. Id. at 408 (citing Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir. 1997)).
113. See Johnson, supra note 75, at 1127.
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Because the answer to that question is invariably yes, Batson claims in the
Fourth Circuit are destined to fail.
114
D. Procedural Default
As a general matter, a federal court cannot review a claim in habeas if the
issue is procedurally barred unless the petitioner can demonstrate "cause" and
"prejudice."'1 5 A procedural default occurs if the petitioner fails to comply with
an established rule of state criminal procedure, such as a contemporaneous
objection requirement.! 16 As I have argued elsewhere, many procedural default
rules do not improve efficiency or promote the systemic interests of comity and
federalism. 117 However, they do permit state and federal courts to affirm patently
unfair and unjust decisions. 118 The Fourth Circuit accepts most state court
assertions of procedural default at face value without rigorously examining the
following: (a) whether the state court default rule actually exists; (b) whether the
rule is consistently and regularly applied; and (c) whether the rule, if it does exist
and is regularly applied, is independent of federal law.' 9
Johnson v. Moore 12 is a painful example of the unblinking acceptance of a
state assertion that a claim was procedurally barred. After the district court
denied Johnson's habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit held that all of Johnson's
habeas challenges to his conviction were defaulted because when Johnson
addressed the jury at the conclusion of the guilt-or-innocence phase of his trial,
,, ,,121
he made the comment that he had "no defense for anything. In denying state
postconviction relief, the state PCR court adopted verbatim an order drafted by
the South Carolina Attorney General's office.122 That order deemed issues going
to guilt barred due to Johnson's admission of guilt.123 However, as Johnson
pointed out in his appellate brief, South Carolina did not have any such rule;
futhermore, Johnson apprized the court of numerous cases where the state courts
reviewed a legal issue going to guilt in capital cases despite much clearer
admissions of guilt than Johnson's vague statement. 124 There was, in short, no
"Suicide for Saying You Are Sorry" rule in South Carolina.
114. See Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that both the prosecution
and the defense can make 'credibility determinations"' in using peremptory challenges (quoting
Howard, 131 F.3d at 408)); Matthews, 105 F.3d at 918 (relying in part on hypothetical demeanor
not found in the record to reject Batson claim).
115. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
116. See John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State Procedural Default
Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998).
117. See id. at42.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 23-25.
120. Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, 1998 WL 708691 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1998).
121. Id. at *3-4, *9.
122. Id. at *13 n.9.
123. Id. at *3.
124. See id. at *4-5; Blume & Wilkins, supra note 116, at 25.
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Johnson then returned to the South Carolina state courts in an effort to
rectify the procedural error.125 He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
original jurisdiction of the South Carolina Supreme Court, asking it to address
the alleged procedural default rule. 126 The state court's subsequent decision
clearly revealed that the Fourth Circuit erred in finding Johnson's claims
defaulted because it emphatically rejected any notion that such a procedural bar
rule existed.127 Johnson then returned to federal court and asked the Fourth
Circuit to recall the mandate to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice.1 28
The court denied Johnson's motion, reasoning that a "change in state law"
did not warrant recalling the mandate.129 Despite the fact that there was ample
reason to question Johnson's guilt, he was subsequently executed without a
federal court reviewing the merits of issues concerning his guilt or innocence.
130
Richard Johnson's case is one of a number of cases where the Fourth Circuit has
failed to inquire into whether a death-sentenced inmate's claim is in fact
procedurally barred under existing Supreme Court doctrine.
131
E. AEDPA
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 132 AEDPA contained a number of habeas
corpus "reforms," including a statute of limitations requiring petitioners to file a
habeas petition within a year of their convictions and sentences becoming "final"
on direct appeal, 133 expedited time lines for the disposition of capital cases by
district courts and federal courts of appeals in certain qualifying "opt-in"
jurisdictions, 134 and restrictions on a federal court's power to grant an
135
evidentiary hearing if the petitioner failed to develop the facts in state court .
But the centerpiece of the legislation was 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which limits a
federal court's ability to grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court
decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
125. See Johnson v. Catoe, 336 S.C. 354, 520 S.E.2d 617 (1999).
126. Id. at 355-56, 520 S.E.2d at 618.
127. See id. at 358-59, 520 S.E.2d at 619.
128. Johnson v. Moore, Nos. 97-33, 97-7801 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 1999) (order denying motion
to recall mandate).
129. Id.
130. See Rick Brundrett & Clif LeBlanc, Lethal Injection Ends Life of Convicted Killer, THE
STATE, May 4, 2002, at Al; Editorial, Governor Should Commute Sentence of Richard Johnson,
THE STATE, Apr. 30, 2002, at A6.
131. See Blume & Wilkins, supra note 116, at 23-26 (discussing other cases).
132. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. For a more detailed discussion of AEDPA and its
effects, see John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259 (2006).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (2006).
134. Id. §§ 2261, 2263, 2266.
135. Id. § 2254(e)(2).
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established Federal law" or involved "an unreasonable determination of the
facts.
13 6
Many provisions of AEDPA have been criticized by scholars and courts as
contributing to the complexity of habeas litigation rather than meaningfully
contributing to making the habeas process more efficient.137 On virtually every
occasion, the Fourth Circuit has construed provisions of AEDPA in the most
state court protective manner. In Rouse v. Lee,138 for example, an African-
American death-row inmate offered uncontradicted evidence that a juror
intentionally concealed during voir dire that his mother had been raped and
murdered "because he wanted to be on the jury that judged Rouse." 139 Moreover,
the evidence established that the same juror was racially biased, referred to
African-Americans as "'niggers[,]' and opin[ed] that African Americans care
less about life than white people do and that African-American men rape white
women in order to brag to their friends."140 The en banc court dismissed Rouse's
habeas petition as untimely because Rouse's attorneys filed the federal habeas
petition one day late. 141 It could have granted Rouse equitable tolling,
1 42
especially given that Rouse lacked the mental capacity to monitor effectively his
court-appointed counsel in such a way so as to prevent the petition from being
143 144filed one day late. But, it elected not to do so.
The circuit has also concluded that, under § 2254(d), state court decisions
that violate federal constitutional law will be upheld unless "all reasonable
jurists" would conclude that the state court decision was unreasonable.145 It has
also held that § 2254(d) supports state court decisions that are "minimally
consistent" with the law 146 or that have objectively reasonable bottom line
136. Id. § 2254(d).
137. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("[J]n a world of silk purses and
pigs' ears, the [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."); LARRY W. YACKLE,
FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 57 (2003) ("AEDPA is notorious for its poor drafting. The Act
is replete with vague and ambiguous language, apparent inconsistency, and plain bad grammar.");
James S. Liebman, An "Effective Death Penalty"? AEDPA and Error Detection in Capital Cases,
67 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 426 (2001) ("AEDPA complicates review ... because of its poor
drafting.").
138. 339 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2003) (en bane).
139. Id. at 257-58 (Motz, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 257.
141. Id. (majority opinion).
142. See id. at 246.
143. See id. at 260 (Motz, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 257 (majority opinion).
145. Sheppard v. Taylor, No. 98-12, 1998 WL 743663, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998) ("We
cannot conclude, however, that at the time Sheppard's convictions and sentences became final, all
reasonable jurists would have agreed that the admission of the evidence to which he points violated
due process.").
146. Blakeney v. Branker, 314 F. App'x 572, 579 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Although the precise
reason for the court's decision is not entirely clear, we must deem the decision to be reasonable if it
'is at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case."' (quoting Wright v.
Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 157 (4th Cir. 1998))).
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"results," even despite flawed factual statements. 47 These are very high hurdles.
Finally, the circuit has also applied a very restrictive interpretation of reasonable
diligence 148 under § 2254(e)(2), which governs when a habeas petitioner is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing, 149 and is the only circuit in the country to
conclude that capital cases should be decided by federal courts under the
expedited opt-in jurisdiction timelines even if the state cannot meet AEDPA's
requirements for such consideration.
150
V. CONCLUSION
The descriptive analysis of reasons why capital habeas petitioners virtually
always lose in the Fourth Circuit, even if empirically correct, is still normatively
debatable. As a normative matter, one might say that the hands off, deferential,
and "all doubts resolved in favor of not disturbing the state court decision"
approach is what federal courts are supposed to do in habeas corpus proceedings,
especially given the restrictions on habeas review contained in AEDPA and
some of the Supreme Court's habeas "reform" decisions. 151 Thus, one could
argue that the Fourth Circuit, or at least the majority of judges on the circuit who
subscribe to this view, have it exactly right. I must concede that this is a
debatable point, one about which reasonable judges and academics can and do
differ. It is also a matter of degree. Nevertheless, I do believe that a careful
review of the Fourth Circuit's capital habeas decisions reveals that it has a more
restrictive view of the nature and function of habeas corpus in capital cases than
virtually any other circuit 152 and a more narrow, state-friendly approach to
adjudicating constitutional claims in capital cases than the approach employed
by the United States Supreme Court in cases where it has granted relief to death-
sentenced inmates who raised claims similar to those discussed in this Essay.
This is not purely idle speculation. The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari and reversed three decisions of the Fourth Circuit in recent
years in cases where the circuit denied relief to a death-sentenced inmate. In two
cases, Wiggins v. Smith153 and (Terry) Williams v. Taylor,154 the Supreme Court
held that the Fourth Circuit erroneously adjudicated the death-sentenced
147. Frogge v. Branker, 286 F. App'x 51, 64-66 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that state court
decision was not "objectively unreasonable" and that state court's erroneous factual statements were
not "ultimately necessary to its bottom-line conclusion").
148. See Williams v. Taylor, 189 F.3d 421, 426-427 (4th Cir. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
149. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006).
150. Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 758-60 (4th Cir. 1998).
151. For a more detailed discussion of Supreme Court and congressional efforts to limit the
scope of federal habeas, see Blume, supra note 132.
152. Id. at 282 n.116.
153. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
154. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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inmate's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 155 In (Michael) Williams v.
Taylor,156 a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Fourth Circuit erroneously
applied the facts of the case to petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 157 Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that
any one of the doctrines, idiosyncratic methodologies, or glosses to Supreme
Court precedent that I discussed previously explains the low success rate. Rather,
it is the combined effect that makes it virtually impossible for a petitioner to
prevail, which-at the end of the habeas day-explains the dismal success rate
of capital habeas petitioners in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.
Finally, let me suggest that-at least at a subconscious level-this may all
be about the death penalty, or more specifically, judges' views about the wisdom
and appropriateness of capital punishment. A judge who thinks that the death
penalty generally is deserved in most death-eligible cases is more likely to find
no prejudice when considering whether the presentation of additional mitigating
evidence might have swayed the jury to choose life over death or to look for
other bases on which to affirm. On the other hand, a judge who thinks that the
death penalty should be imposed rarely may take a different view as to the
presence of error or the effect of errors on outcomes. While legal realism is a bit
out of fashion in academia these days-primarily because everyone now is, truth
be told, a legal realist-it almost could not help but be the case that all of our
views about society's ultimate punishment will influence how we think the
machinery of death is working.
155. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 519; Williams, 529 U.S. at 367.
156. 529 U.S. 420 (2000).
157. See id. at 440-43 (concluding that on two of petitioner's three claims, the Fourth Circuit
erroneously held under § 2254(e)(2) that petitioner failed to exercise diligence in developing the
factual basis for his claims).
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APPENDIX A
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL HABEAS CASES IN THE MODERN ERA
(THROUGH OCTOBER 2009)158
Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Hooks v. Branker, Niemeyer author denial of relief
No. 08-12, 2009 WL Michael unanimous affirmed
3403315 (4th Cir. King
Oct. 23, 2009)
Stephens v. Branker, King author denial of relief
570 F.3d 198 (4th Shedd unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2009) Agee
Hyatt v. Branker, 569 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 162 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
2009) Traxler
Wolfe v. Johnson, King author denial of relief
565 F.3d 140 (4th Shedd unanimous affirmed in part; case
Cir. 2009) Duncan remanded for an
evidentiary hearing,
resolution of a Schiup
issue, and
examination of Brady
and Giglio claims
158. Because this chart includes all decisions in capital cases, some cases will appear more
than once. For example, cases in which panel decisions were later revisited on rehearing or
rehearing en banc will result in entries for the panel decision as well as entries for any subsequent
decisions.
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Powell v. Kelly, 562 Shedd author denial of relief
F.3d 656 (4th Cir. Motz majority affirmed
2009) Gregory concurring
in part;
dissentingin part
Blakeney v. Branker, King author denial of relief
314 F. App'x 572 Michael majority affirmed
(4th Cir. 2009) Gregory concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Davis v. Branker, 305 Traxler author denial of relief
F. App'x 926 (4th King unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2009) Hamilton
Larry v. Branker, 552 Shedd author denial of relief
F.3d 356 (4th Cir. Traxler unanimous affirmed
2009) Hamilton
Ivey v. Ozmint, 304 F. Agee author denial of relief
App'x 144 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
2008) Traxler
Moseley v. Branker, Traxler author denial of relief
550 F.3d 312 (4th Shedd unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) Duncan
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Cole v. Branker, 328 Michael author denial of relief
F. App'x 149 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) Shedd
Frogge v. Branker, Niemeyer per curiam denial of relief
286 F. App'x 51 (4th King affirmed
Cir. 2008) Gregory dissenting
Hyde v. Branker, 286 Wilkinson per curiam denial of relief
F. App'x 822 (4th Niemeyer affirmed
Cir. 2008) Motz
Strickland v. Branker, Michael author denial of relief
284 F. App'x 57 (4th Williams unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) Motz
Gray v. Branker, 529 Michael author denial of relief
F.3d 220 (4th Cir. Gregory majority reversed; sentencing-
2008) Duncan concurring phase relief granted
in part;
dissenting
in part
Jackson v. Johnson, Williams author denial of relief
523 F.3d 273 (4th Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) Duncan
Yarbrough v. Niemeyer author denial of relief
Johnson, 520 F.3d Traxler unanimous affirmed
329 (4th Cir. 2008) Hamilton
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Cagle v. Branker, Wilkinson author denial of relief
520 F.3d 320 (4th Michael unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) King
Golphin v. Branker, Williams author denial of relief
519 F.3d 168 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) Michael
Lawrence v. Branker, Williams author grant of penalty-
517 F.3d 700 (4th Motz unanimous phase relief reversed;
Cir. 2008) King denial of relief on
other issues affirmed
Green v. Johnson, Shedd author denial of relief
515 F.3d 290 (4th Wilkinson majority affirmed
Cir. 2008) Motz concurring
Bowie v. Branker, Duncan author denial of relief
512 F.3d 112 (4th Michael unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2008) King
Gardner v. Ozmint, Motz author denial of relief
511 F.3d 420 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2007) Gregory
Call v. Branker, 254 Traxler per curiam denial of relief
F. App'x 257 (4th King affirmed
Cir. 2007) Legg (D. Md.)
Meyer v. Branker, Wilkinson author denial of relief
506 F.3d 358 (4th Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2007) Shedd
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Moses v. Branker, Michael author denial of relief
No. 06-8, 2007 WL Motz unanimous affirmed
3083548 (4th Cir. Anderson
Oct. 23, 2007) (D.S.C.)
Williams v. Ozmint, Michael author grant of penalty-
494 F.3d 478 (4th Niemeyer unanimous phase relief reversed;
Cir. 2007) Wilkins denial of guilt-phase
relief affirmed
Hill v. Polk, 230 F. Wilkinson per curiam denial of relief
App'x 285 (4th Cir. Gregory affirmed
2007) Duncan
McNeill v. Polk, 476 Shedd author denial of relief
F.3d 206 (4th Cir. King concurring affirmed
2007) in part
Gregory concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Wilkinson v. Polk, Wilkins author denial of relief
2007 WL 1051436 Traxler unanimous affirmed
(4th Cir. April 5, Gregory
2007)
Cummings v. Polk, King author denial of relief
475 F.3d 230 (4th Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2007) Williams
2010]
HeinOnline -- 61 S. C. L. Rev. 491 2009-2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Emmett v. Kelly, 474 Traxler author denial of relief
F.3d 154 (4th Cir. Shedd majority affirmed
2007) Gregory concurring
in part;
dissentingin part
Shuler v. Ozmint, 209 Wilkins author denial of relief
F. App'x 224 (4th Widener unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2006) Duncan
Lynch v. Polk, 204 F. Michael author denial of relief
App'x 167 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
2006) Motz
Stroud v. Polk, 466 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 291 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
2006) Traxler
Walker v. Kelly, 195 Floyd (D.S.C.) author denial of relief
F. App'x 169 (4th Gregory concurring vacated; case
Cir. 2006) Williams dissenting remanded for
evidentiary hearing
Daughtry v. Polk, Wilkins per curiam denial of relief
190 F. App'x 262 Shedd affirmed
(4th Cir. 2006) Hamilton
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Schmitt v. Kelly, 189 Williams per curiam denial of relief
F. App'x 257 (4th Michael affirmed
Cir. 2006) Hamilton
Conaway v. Polk, 453 King author denial of relief
F.3d 567 (4th Cir. Duncan majority affirmed in part;
2006) Widener concurring remanded in part for
evidentiary hearing
Buckner v. Polk, 453 Duncan author denial of relief
F.3d 195 (4th Cir. Shedd majority affirmed
2006) Gregory concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Campbell v. Polk, Wilkinson author denial of relief
447 F.3d 270 (4th Hamilton majority affirmed
Cir. 2006) Michael concurring
in part
Lenz v. Washington, Wilkinson author denial of relief
444 F.3d 295 (4th Wilkins unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2006) Luttig
Hedrick v. True, 443 Gregory author of denial of relief
F.3d 342 (4th Cir. Parts 1-111; affirmed
2006) dissent of
Part IV;
concur of
Part V
Widener joined
Gregory
Hamilton author of
Parts IV-V
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Billings v. Polk, 441 Luttig author denial of relief
F.3d 238 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
2006) Michael
Walton v. Johnson,
440 F.3d 160 (4th
Cir. 2006) (en banc)
Shedd
Widener
Wilkinson
Niemeyer
Luttig
Williams
Duncan
Wilkins
Michael
Motz
Traxler
King
Gregory
author
majority
majority;
wrote
separately
concurring
in the
judgment
majority
majority
majority;
wrote
separately
concurring
in the
judgment
majority
dissenting
joined
Wilkins
joined
Wilkins
joined
Wilkins
joined
Wilkins
joined
Wilkins
panel's reversal of
denial of relief
vacated; district
court's denial of relief
affirmed
Robinson v. Polk, 438 Williams author denial of relief
F.3d 350 (4th Cir. Shedd majority affirmed
2006) King dissenting
in part
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Vinson v. True, 436 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 412 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
2005) Duncan
Brown v. Polk, 135 F. Traxler author denial of relief
App'x 618 (4th Cir. Luttig unanimous affirmed
2005) Michael
Moody v. Polk, 408 Luttig author denial of relief
F.3d 141 (4th Cir. Wilkinson majority affirmed
2005) Traxler concurring
Conner v. Polk, 407 King author denial of relief
F.3d 198 (4th Cir. Shedd majority affirmed
2005) Luttig dissenting
Walton v. Johnson, Motz author denial of relief
407 F.3d 285 (4th Wilkins majority vacated; case
Cir. 2005), vacated Shedd dissenting remanded for
on reh 'g en banc, 440 evidentiary hearing
F.3d 160 (4th Cir. on mental retardation
2006) claim
Simpson v. Polk, 129 Traxler author denial of relief
F. App'x 782 (4th Motz unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2005) Gregory
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Lovitt v. True, 403 Wilkinson author denial of relief
F.3d 171 (4th Cir. Williams unanimous affirmed
2005) Traxler
Walker v. True, 401 Luttig author denial of relief
F.3d 574 (4th Cir. Williams majority affirmed
2005), vacated, 546 Gregory dissenting
U.S. 1086 (2006)
(unpublished table
decision)
Jones v. Polk, 401 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 257 (4th Cir. Widener majority affirmed
2005) Michael concurring
Walker v. True, 399 Luttig author denial of relief
F.3d 315 (4th Cir. Broadwater majority vacated; case
2005) (N.D.W. Va.) remanded for
Gregory concurring evidentiary hearing
in part, on mental retardation
dissenting claim
in part
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Humphries v. Ozmint, Hamilton author denial of relief
397 F.3d 206 (4th Wilkins majority affirmed
Cir. 2005) (en banc) Widener majority
Niemeyer majority
Luttig majority
Williams majority
Motz majority
Traxler majority
King majority
Shedd majority
Wilkinson dissenting
Michael joined
Wilkinson
Gregory joined
Wilkinson
Duncan joined
Wilkinson
McHone v. Polk, 392 Luttig author denial of relief
F.3d 691 (4th Cir. Wilkins majority affirmed
2004) Gregory concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Syriani v. Polk, 118 Traxler author denial of relief
F. App'x 706 (4th Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2004) Shedd
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Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Kandies v. Polk, 385 Gregory announcing denial of relief
F.3d 457 (4th Cir. judgment of affirmed
2004), vacated mem., the court
545 U.S. 1137 (2005) and writing
separately
Michael concurring
in the
judgment
Traxler concurring
in the
judgment
Longworth v. Ozmint, Niemeyer author denial of relief
377 F.3d 437 (4th Michael unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2004) Gregory
Richmond v. Polk, Gregory author denial of relief
375 F.3d 309 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2004) King
Humphries v. Ozmint, Wilkinson author denial of relief
366 F.3d 266 (4th Duncan majority reversed in part,
Cir. 2004), vacated Hamilton concurring affirmed in part; case
on reh 'g en banc, 397 in part; remanded for
F.3d 206 (4th Cir. dissenting issuance of writ as to
2005) (affirming in part sentence only
district court's
dismissal of habeas
petition)
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Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d Wilkins per curiam denial of relief on
319 (4th Cir. 2004) Michael McKoy claim
(en banc) Motz reversed; denial of
Traxler relief on remaining
King grounds affirmed
Gregory
Shedd
Niemeyer
Wilkinson
Luttig
Williams
Bailey v. True, 100 F. Niemeyer per curiam dismissal of petition
App'x 128 (4th Cir. Luttig affirmed
2004) Williams
Chandler v. Lee, 89 Wilkins author denial of relief
F. App'x 830 Widener unanimous affirmed
(4th Cir. 2004) Shedd
Wilson v. Ozmint, Luttig author grant of relief vacated
Wilkins unanimous
352 F.3d 847 (4th Widener
Cir. 2003)
Orbe v. True, 82 F. Williams per curiam dismissal of petition
App'x 802 Traxler affirmed
(4th Cir. 2003) Hamilton
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Tucker v. Ozmint, Shedd author denial of relief
350 F.3d 433 (4th Michael unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2003) Motz
Reid v. True, 349 Wilkins author denial of relief
F.3d 788 (4th Cir. Gregory unanimous affirmed
2003) Shedd
Rouse v. Lee, 339 Williams author dismissal of habeas
F.3d 238 (4th Cir. Wilkins majority petition as untimely
2003) (en banc) Widener majority affirmed
Wilkinson majority
Niemeyer majority
Traxler majority
Shedd majority
Motz dissenting
Michael joined Motz
King joined Motz
Gregory joined Motz
Byram v. Ozmint, 339 Wilkinson author denial of relief
F.3d 203 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
2003) Niemeyer
Hill v. Ozmint, 339 King author denial of relief
F.3d 187 (4th Cir. Michael unanimous affirmed
2003) Motz
Perkins v. Lee, 72 F. Traxler author denial of relief
App'x 4 (4th Cir. Michael unanimous affirmed
2003) King
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Bell v. Ozmint, 332 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 229 (4th Cir. Wilkins unanimous affirmed
2003) Wilkinson
Walker v. True, 67 F. Luttig per curiam certificate of
App'x 758 (4th Cir. Williams appealability (COA)
2003), vacated mem. Gregory granted in part;
540 U.S. 1013 (2003) dismissal of petition
affirmed
Rowsey v. Lee, 327 Wilkinson author COA granted in part;
F.3d 335 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous denial of relief
2003) Niemeyer affirmed
Swisher v. True, 325 Williams author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 225 (4th Cir. Luttig unanimous dismissed
2003) Hamilton
Walton v. Angelone, Hamilton author COA denied; appeal
321 F.3d 442 (4th Wilkins unanimous dismissed
Cir. 2003) Motz
Brown v. Lee, 319 Traxler author appeal dismissed in
F.3d 162 (4th Cir. Luttig unanimous part; reversed in part;
2003) Michael and remanded for
merits review of one
claim
Allen v. Lee, 319 F.3d Gregory author denial of relief
645 (4th Cir. 2003), Motz majority reversed
vacated on reh 'g en Niemeyer dissenting
bane, 366 F.3d 319
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Lyons v. Lee, 316 Williams author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 528 (4th Cir. Luttig majority dismissed
2003) Gregory concurring
Daniels v. Lee, 316 King author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 477 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous dismissed
2003) Widener
Bramblett v. True, 59 Wilkins author dismissal of petition
F. App'x 1 (4th Cir. Traxler majority affirmed in part;
2003) Michael dissenting appeal dismissed in
part
Rouse v. Lee, 314 Motz author dismissal of petition
F.3d 698 (4th Cir. King majority as untimely vacated;
2003), vacated on Williams dissenting case remanded
reh 'g en banc, 339
F.3d 238 (4th Cir.
2003)
Jones v. Cooper, 311 Luttig author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 306 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous dismissed
2002) Williams
Bates v. Lee, 308 Wilkinson author dismissal of petition
F.3d 411 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
2002) Hamilton
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Kasi v. Angelone, 300 Traxler author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 487 (4th Cir. Wilkins unanimous dismissed
2002) King
Williams v. True, 39 Wilkinson per curiam grant of relief
F. App'x 830 (4th Niemeyer affirmed
Cir. 2002) Williams
Hunt v. Lee, 291 F.3d Niemeyer author denial of relief
284 (4th Cir. 2002) King unanimous affirmed
Gregory
Fullwood v. Lee, 290 Traxler author denial of relief
F.3d 663 (4th Cir. Michael majority affirmed in part and
2002) Widener concurring reversed in part;
in part; remanded for
dissenting evidentiary hearing
in part on two claims of juror
misconduct
Basden v. Lee, 290 Motz author denial of relief
F.3d 602 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
2002) Gregory
Wiggins v. Corcoran, Widener author grants of guilt-phase
288 F.3d 629 (4th Wilkinson concurring relief for insufficient
Cir. 2002), rev 'd sub Niemeyer concurring evidence and
nom. Wiggins v. sentencing-phase
Smith, 539 U.S. 510 relief for ineffective
(2003) assistance of counsel
(JAG) reversed
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Ivey v. Catoe, 36 F. Wilkins author COA denied; appeal
App'x 718 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous dismissed
2002) Niemeyer
Booth-El v. Nuth, 288 Wilkinson author grant of sentencing-
F.3d 571 (4th Cir. Wilkins unanimous phase relief reversed;
2002) Gregory denial of guilt-phase
relief affirmed
Carter v. Lee, 283 King author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 240 (4th Cir. Motz unanimous dismissed
2002) Gregory
Hartman v. Lee, 283 Wilkins author denial of relief
F.3d 190 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
2002) Michael
McWee v. Weldon, Luttig author COA denied; appeal
283 F.3d 179 (4th Michael unanimous dismissed
Cir. 2002) King
Burch v. Corcoran, King author denial of relief
273 F.3d 577 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 2001) Niemeyer
Beck v. Angelone, Hamilton author COA denied; appeal
261 F.3d 377 (4th Widener unanimous dismissed
Cir. 2001) Motz
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Jones v. Catoe, 9 F. Wilkins author denial of relief
App'x 245 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
2001) Luttig
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d Williams author grant of sentencing-
676 (4th Cir. 2001) Michael unanimous phase relief reversed;
Traxler COA denied on
petitioner's cross-
appeal
Mickens v. Taylor, Widener author panel's reversal of
240 F.3d 348 (4th Wilkinson majority denial of relief
Cir. 2001) (en banc), Wilkins majority vacated; district
aff'd, 535 U.S. 162 Niemeyer majority court's denial of relief
(2002) Luttig majority affirmed
Williams majority
Traxler majority
Michael dissenting
Motz joined
Michael
King joined
Michael
Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d King author COA denied; appeal
897 (4th Cir. 2000) Wilkinson unanimous dismissed
Motz
Skipper v. Lee, No. Williams author denial of relief
00-8, 2000 WL Widener unanimous affirmed
1853330 (4th Cir. Michael
Dec. 19, 2000)
2010]
HeinOnline -- 61 S. C. L. Rev. 505 2009-2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
White v. Lee, No. 00- Traxler author denial of relief
3, 2000 WL 1803290 Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
(4th Cir. Dec. 8, Stamp (N.D.W.
2000) Va.)
Mickens v. Taylor, Michael author denial of guilt-phase
227 F.3d 203 (4th Motz majority relief reversed
Cir. 2000), vacated Widener dissenting
on reh 'g en banc, 240
F.3d 348 (4th Cir.
2001) (en banc),
aff'd, 535 U.S. 162
(2002)
Goins v. Angelone, King author COA denied; appeal
226 F.3d 312 (4th Luttig unanimous dismissed
Cir. 2000), overruled Traxler
by Bell v. Jarvis, 236
F.3d 149 (4th Cir.
2000)
Bacon v. Lee, 225 Niemeyer author grant of sentencing-
F.3d 470 (4th Cir. Traxler majority phase relief reversed;
2000) King concurring district court's denial
in part; of guilt-phase relief
dissenting affirmed
in part
Fisher v. Lee, 215 Traxler author COA denied; appeal
F.3d 438 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous dismissed
2000) Goodwin
(S.D.W. Va.)
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Graham v. Angelone, Traxler author grant of partial COA
No. 99-4, 1999 WL Widener unanimous affirmed; COA on
710385 (4th Cir. Niemeyer remaining claims
Sept. 13, 1999) denied; appeal
dismissed
Royal v. Taylor, 188 Motz author dismissal of petition
F.3d 239 (4th Cir. Luttig unanimous affirmed
1999) Michael
Ramdass v. Angelone, Widener author grant of sentencing-
187 F.3d 396 (4th Niemeyer majority phase relief reversed;
Cir. 1999), aff'd, 530 Mumaghan concurring denial of guilt-phase
U.S. 156 (2000) in part; relief affirmed
dissenting
in part
Williams v. Taylor, Wilkinson author denial of relief
189 F.3d 421 (4th Hamilton unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1999), aff'd in Williams
part, rev 'd in part,
529 U.S. 420 (2000)
Harris v. French, No. Ervin per curiam denial of relief
98-34, 1999 WL Hamilton affirmed
496941 (4th Cir. July Williams
14, 1999), abrogated
by McCarver v. Lee,
221 F.3d 583 (4th
Cir. 2000)
Joseph v. Angelone, Widener author COA denied; appeal
184 F.3d 320 (4th Mumaghan unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1999) Motz
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Colvin-El v. Nuth, Niemeyer author grant of sentencing-
Nos. 98-27, 98-29, Wilkinson unanimous phase relief reversed;
1999 WL 436776 Michael denial of guilt-phase
(4th Cir. June 17, relief affirmed
1999)
Mueller v. Angelone, Luttig author COA denied; appeal
181 F.3d 557 (4th Motz unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1999) Traxler
Weeks v. Angelone, Williams author COA denied; petition
176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir Wilkinson unanimous dismissed
1999) Hamilton
Roach v. Angelone, King author COA denied; appeal
176 F.3d 210 (4th Widener unanimous dismissed.
Cir. 1999) Niemeyer
Williams v. Angelone, Wilkins author denial of relief
No. 98-29, 1999 WL Traxler unanimous affirmed
249026 (4th Cir. Apr. Faber (S.D.W.
29, 1999) Va.)
Thomas v. Taylor, Luttig author COA denied; appeal
170 F.3d 466 (4th Ervin unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1999) King
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Rocheville v. Moore, Wilkins per curiam COA denied; appeal
No. 98-23, 1999 WL Michael dismissed
140668 (4th Cir. Mar. Traxler
16, 1999)
Swann v. Taylor, No. Traxler author denial of relief
98-20, 1999 WL Michael unanimous affirmed in part;
92435 (4th Cir. Feb. Butzner district court's denial
18, 1999) of claim relating to
competency to be
executed vacated and
remanded with
instructions to
dismiss without
prejudice
Jenkins v. Angelone, Niemeyer author grants of COAs on
No. 98-13, 1999 WL Ervin unanimous two claims affirmed;
9944 (4th Cir. Jan. Butzner COAs on two other
12, 1999) claims denied, and
corresponding claims
dismissed
Yeatts v. Angelone, Wilkins author certificate of probable
166 F.3d 255 (4th Luttig majority cause (CPC) denied;
Cir. 1999) Hamilton concurring appeal dismissed
in part;
concurring
in the
judgment
Drayton v. Moore, Hamilton per curiam denial of relief
No. 98-18, 1999 WL Michael affirmed
10073 (4th Cir. Jan. Murnaghan dissenting
12, 1999)
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Chichester v. Taylor, Wilkinson per curiam COA denied; appeal
No. 98-15, 1999 WL Luttig dismissed
3736 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, Motz
1999)
Sexton v. French, 163 Hamilton author denial of relief
F.3d 874 (4th Cir. Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
1998) Motz
Williams v. Taylor, Williams author grant of sentencing-
163 F.3d 860 (4th Widener unanimous phase relief reversed;
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 592 Michael denial of relief on all
U.S. 362 (2000) other claims affirmed
Fisher v. Angelone, Williams author CPC denied; appeal
163 F.3d 835 (4th Widener unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1998) Luttig
Keel v. French, 162 Murnaghan author denial of relief
F.3d 263 (4th Cir. Williams unanimous affirmed
1998) Motz
Quesinberry v. Butzner author denial of relief
Taylor, 162 F.3d 273 Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
(4th Cir. 1998) Motz
Fry v. Angelone, No. Wilkins author COA denied; appeal
98-8, 1998 WL Murnaghan unanimous dismissed
746859 (4th Cir. Oct. Luttig
26, 1998)
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Sheppard v. Taylor, Wilkins author denial of relief
No. 98-12, 1998 WL Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
743663 (4th Cir. Oct. Niemeyer
23, 1998)
Ward v. French, No. Wilkins author denial of relief
98-7, 1998 WL Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
743664 (4th Cir. Oct. Michael
23, 1998)
Johnson v. Moore, Wilkins author denial of relief
Nos. 97-33, 97-7801, Williams majority affirmed
1998 WL 708691 Ervin concurring
(4th Cir. Sept. 24, in part;
1998) dissenting
in part
Wilson v. Greene, Wilkinson author denial of relief
155 F.3d 396 (4th Niemeyer majority affirmed
Cir. 1998) Michael concurring
in part;
concurring
in thejudgment
Cardwell v. Greene, Mumaghan author denial of relief
152 F.3d 331 (4th Widener unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1998), overruled Michael
by Bell v. Jarvis, 236
F.3d 149 (4th Cir.
2000)
Wright v. Angelone, Williams author COA denied; appeal
151 F.3d 151 (4th Michael unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1998) (quorum)
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Fitzgerald v. Greene, Williams author COA denied; appeal
150 F.3d 357 (4th Widener unanimous dismissed
Cir. 1998) Hamilton
Boyd v. French, 147 Wilkins author denial of relief
F.3d 319 (4th Cir. Ervin majority affirmed
1998) Mumaghan concurring
Strickler v. Pruett, Niemeyer per curiam grant of guilt-phase
Nos. 97-29, 97-30, Hamilton relief reversed; denial
1998 WL 340420 Luttig writing of relief on remaining
(4th Cir. June 17, separately claims affirmed
1998)
Brown v. French, 147 Ervin author denial of relief
F.3d 307 (4th Cir. Murnaghan unanimous affirmed
1998) Moon
(W.D.Va.)
Stewart v. Angelone, Widener per curiam dismissal of petition
No. 97-26, 1998 WL Hamilton affirmed
276291 (4th Cir. May Motz
29, 1998)
Dubois v. Greene, Wilkins per curiam COA denied; appeal
No. 97-21, 1998 WL Luttig dismissed
276282 (4th Cir. May Motz
26, 1998)
Chandler v. Greene, Niemeyer author denial of relief
No. 97-27, 1998 WL Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
279344 (4th Cir. May Widener
20, 1998)
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Williams v. French, Hamilton author denial of relief
146 F.3d 203 (4th Butzner unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1998) Moon
(W.D.Va.)
Green v. French, 143 Luttig author dismissal of petition
F.3d 865 (4th Cir. Butzner majority affirmed
1998), overruled by Ervin concurring
Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000)
Truesdale v. Moore, Wilkinson author denial of relief
142 F.3d 749 (4th Williams unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1998) Michael
King v. Greene, No. Widener per curiam denial of relief
07-28, 1998 WL Motz affirmed
183909 (4th Cir. Clarke (E.D.
April 20, 1998) Va.)
Eaton v. Angelone, Wilkinson author denial of relief
139 F.3d 990 (4th Hamilton unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1998) Michael
Roberts v. Moore, Wilkins author CPC denied; appeal
No. 97-12, 1998 WL Niemeyer unanimous dismissed
41683 (4th Cir. Feb. Williams
4, 1998)
Smith v. Moore, 137 Williams author denial of relief
F.3d 808 (4th Cir. Luttig majority affirmed
1998) Motz concurring
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Atkins v. Moore, No. Wilkins author denial of relief
97-17, 1998 WL Russell unanimous affirmed
93409 (4th Cir. Mar. (present at oral (quorum)
5, 1998) argument but
died prior to
decision)
Widener
Arnold v. Evatt, 113 Russell author denial of relief
F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
1997) Motz
Breard v. Pruett, 134 Hamilton author denial of relief
F.3d 615 (4th Cir. Williams majority affirmed
1998) Butzner concurring
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Gilbert v. Moore, 134
F.3d 642 (4th Cir.
1998) (en banc)
Wilkins
Wilkinson
Widener
Murnaghan
Ervin
Niemeyer
Luttig
Williams
Hamilton
Michael
Motz
author
majority
majority
majority
majority
majority
majority
majority
concurring
in part;
concurring
in the
judgment
concurring
in part;
concurring
in the
judgment
concurring
in part;
concurring
in the
judgment
panel affirmance of
district court's grant
of relief vacated;
district court's grant
of relief reversed
Gilliam v. Simms, No. Niemeyer author denial of relief
97-14, 1998 WL Murnaghan unanimous affirmed
17041 (4th Cir. Jan. Hamilton
13, 1998)
Noland v. French, Ervin author denial of guilt-phase
134 F.3d 208 (4th Hamilton unanimous relief affirmed; grant
Cir. 1998) Luttig of sentencing-phase
relief reversed
Watkins v. Angelone, Michael per curiam denial of relief
No. 97-9, 1998 WL Butzner affirmed
2861 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, Bullock
1998) (M.D.N.C.)
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Mackall v. Angelone, Wilkins author denial of relief
131 F.3d 442 (4th Wilkinson majority affirmed
Cir. 1997) (en banc) Russell majority
Widener majority
Niemeyer majority
Hamilton majority
Luttig majority
Williams majority
Michael majority
Motz majority
Butzner dissenting
Mumaghan joined
Butzner
Howard v. Moore, Williams author denial of relief
131 F.3d 399 (4th Wilkinson majority affirmed
Cir. 1997) (en banc) Russell majority
Widener majority
Wilkins majority
Niemeyer majority
Hamilton majority
Luttig majority
Michael dissenting
Hall joined
Michael
Murnaghan joined
Michael
Motz joined
Michael
Skipper v. French, Phillips author district court's
130 F.3d 603 (4th Widener unanimous procedural-default
Cir. 1997) Michael dismissal vacated;
remand for merits
review
Plath v. Moore, 130 Russell author denial of relief
F.3d 595 (4th Cir. Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
1997) Motz
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Beavers v. Pruett, Wilkins author CPC denied; appeal
No. 97-4, 1997 WL Luttig unanimous dismissed
585739 (4th Cir. Sept Williams
23, 1997)
Satcher v. Pruett, 126 Michael author grant of relief
F.3d 561 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous reversed
1997) Wilkins
Mu 'min v. Pruett, Wilkins author dismissal of petition
125 F.3d 192 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1997) Motz
Matthews v. Evatt, Hamilton author denial of relief
105 F.3d 907 (4th Widener unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1997) Phillips
Gilbert v. Moore, 121 Russell author grant of relief
F.3d 144 (4th Cir. Murnaghan unanimous affirmed
1997), vacated on Motz
reh'g en bane, 134
F.3d 642 (1998)
Murphy v. Luttig author COA denied; appeal
Netherland, 116 F.3d Niemeyer unanimous dismissed
97 (4th Cir. 1997) Michael
Pope v. Netherland, Butzner author grant of relief
113 F.3d 1364 (4th Hall majority reversed
Cir. 1997) Wilkinson concurring
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Smith v. Angelone, Motz author denial of relief
111 F.3d 1126 (4th Niemeyer unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1997) Luttig
Mackall v. Murray, Ervin author dismissal of petition
109 F.3d 957 (4th Mumaghan unanimous affirmed in part,
Cir. 1997), vacated Butzner reversed in part, and
on reh 'g en bane sub remanded in part
nom. Mackall v.
Angelone, 131 F.3d
442 (4th Cir. 1997)
Buchanan v. Butzner author denial of relief
Angelone, 103 F.3d Hall unanimous affirmed
344 (4th Cir. 1996) Ervin
George v. Angelone, Wilkins author dismissal of petition
100 F.3d 353 (4th Wilkinson unanimous affirmed and
Cir. 1996) Williams modified to provide
for dismissal with
prejudice
Beaver v. Netherland, Widener author stay of mandate
101 F.3d 977 (4th Luttig concurring extended; stay of
Cir. 1996) in part; execution denied
dissenting
in part
Hall concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
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Gray v. Netherland, Wilkinson author case remanded for
99 F.3d 158 (4th Cir. Hall unanimous dismissal of petition
1996) Wilkins (on remand from
Supreme Court
following vacatur of
court of appeals'
decision reversing
grant of sentencing-
phase relief)
O'Dell v. Netherland, Luttig author grant of sentencing-
95 F.3d 1214 (4th Wilkinson majority phase relief reversed;
Cir. 1996) (en banc) Russell majority denial of guilt-phase
Widener majority relief affirmed
Wilkins majority
Niemeyer majority
Williams majority
Ervin concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Hall joined Ervin
Murnaghan joined Ervin
Hamilton joined Ervin
Michael joined Ervin
Motz joined Ervin
Stout v. Netherland, Wilkinson per curiam grants of relief from
Nos. 95-4008, 95- Hamilton capital murder guilty
4007, 1996 WL Williams plea and death
496601 (4th Cir. sentence reversed;
Sept. 3, 1996) case remanded with
instructions to
reinstate death
sentence
Beaver v. Thompson, Widener author dismissal of relief
93 F.3d 1186 (4th Luttig majority affirmed
Cir. 1996) Hall dissenting
2010]
HeinOnline -- 61 S. C. L. Rev. 519 2009-2010
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Name of Case Sitting Opinion Comments
Judges
Hoke v. Netherland, Luttig author grant of relief
92 F.3d 1350 (4th Russell majority reversed
Cir. 1996) Hall dissenting
Bennett v. Angelone, Phillips author dismissal of petition
92 F.3d 1336 (4th Widener unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1996) Motz
Payne v. Netherland, Wilkins author denial of relief
No. 95-4016, 1996 Widener majority affirmed
WL 467642 (4th Cir. Michael concurring
Aug. 19, 1996)
Savino v. Murray, 82 Mumaghan author dismissal of petition
F.3d 593 (4th Cir. Luttig unanimous affirmed
1996) Williams
Tuggle v. Netherland, Hamilton author case remanded for
79 F.3d 1386 (4th Widener unanimous dismissal of petition
Cir. 1996) Chapman (on remand from
Supreme Court
following vacatur of
court of appeals'
decision reversing
grant of sentencing-
phase relief)
Middleton v. Evatt, Wilkins per curiam denial of relief
No. 94-4015, 1996 Niemeyer affirmed
WL 63038 (4th Cir. Williams
Feb 14, 1996)
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Townes v. Angelone, Niemeyer per curiam denial of relief
73 F.3d 545 (4th Cir. Luttig affirmed
1996) Phillips
Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d Russell author denial of relief
421 (4th Cir. 1995) Michael unanimous affirmed
Motz
Townes v. Murray, 68 Phillips author dismissal of petition
F.3d 840 (4th Cir. Niemeyer majority affirmed
1995) Luttig concurring
Kornahrens v. Evatt, Williams author denial of relief
66 F.3d 1350 (4th Hamilton majority affirmed
Cir. 1995) Motz concurring
Thomas-Bey v. Nuth, Hall per curiam grant of sentencing-
Nos. 95-4000, 95- Murnaghan phase relief and
4001, 1995 WL Butzner denial of guilt-phase
561296 (4th Cir. relief affirmed
Sept. 22, 1995)
Correll v. Thompson, Wilkins author grant of guilt-phase
63 F.3d 1279 (4th Wilkinson unanimous relief reversed
Cir. 1995) Phillips
Tuggle v. Thompson, Chapman author grant of sentencing-
57 F.3d 1356 (4th Widener unanimous phase relief reversed
Cir. 1995), vacated Hamilton
sub nom. Tuggle v.
Netherland, 516 U.S.
10 (1995)
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Barnes v. Thompson, Luttig author grant of sentencing-
58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. Williams majority phase relief reversed
1995) Mumaghan concurring
Gray v. Thompson, Wilkinson author grant of sentencing-
58 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. Wilkins majority phase relief reversed
1995) Hall concurring
Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d Russell author denial of relief
1327 (4th Cir. 1995) Mumaghan unanimous affirmed
Williams
Turner v. Jabe, 58 Michael author dismissal of petition
F.3d 924 (4th Cir. Hall majority affirmed
1995) Luttig concurring
in the
judgment
Noland v. Dixon, No. Ervin per curiam grant of relief
93-4011, 1995 WL Hamilton vacated; case
253149 (4th Cir. May Luttig remanded for further
1, 1995), rev'd after proceedings
remand sub nom.
Noland v. French,
134 F.3d 208 (4th
Cir. 1998)
Edmonds v. Jabe, No. Ervin per curiam denial of motion for
95-4002, 1995 WL Luttig stay and dismissal of
26690 (4th Cir. Jan. Hall second petition
23, 1995) affirmed
Stockton v. Murray, Wilkinson author denial of relief
41 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. Ervin unanimous affirmed
1994) Widener
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Turner v. Williams, Michael author denial of relief
35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. Hall majority affirmed
1994), overruled by Luttig concurring
O'Dell v. Netherland,
95 F.3d 1214 (4th
Cir. 1996)
Adams v. Aiken, 41 Butzner author denial of relief
F.3d 175 (4th Cir. Wilkins unanimous affirmed
1994) Sprouse
Huffstetler v. Dixon, Ervin per curiam denial of relief
No. 93-4003, 1994 Williams affirmed
WL 31363028 (4th Sprouse
Cir. June 30, 1994)
Lawson v. Dixon, No. Ervin per curiam denial of second
94-4004, 1994 WL Widener petition and motion
258586 (4th Cir. June Niemeyer for stay of execution
13, 1994) affirmed
Spencer v. Murray, Widener author denial of relief
18 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. Phillips unanimous affirmed
1994) Williams
Spencer v. Murray, Widener author denial of relief
18 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. Phillips unanimous affirmed
1994) Williams
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Edmonds v. Ervin per curiam grant of sentencing-
Thompson, Nos. 92- Hall phase relief reversed
4011, 92-4012, 1994 Luttig
WL 47745 (4th Cir.
Feb. 16, 1994)
Smith v. Dixon, 14 Wilkins author grant of sentencing-
F.3d 956 (4th Cir. Russell majority phase relief reversed
1994) Widener majority
Niemeyer majority
Luttig majority
Williams majority
Hall concurring
Hamilton joined Hall
Sprouse dissenting
Ervin joined
Sprouse
Phillips joined
Sprouse
Mumaghan joined
Sprouse
Butzner joined
Sprouse
Washington v. Wilkinson author denial of relief
Murray, 4 F.3d 1285 Phillips majority affirmed
(4th Cir. 1993) Butzner dissenting
Spencer v. Murray, 5 Widener author denial of relief
F.3d 758 (4th Cir. Phillips unanimous affirmed
1993) Williams
Lawson v. Dixon, 3 Ervin author denial of relief
F.3d 743 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
1993) Niemeyer
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Watkins v. Murray, Ervin per curiam dismissal of petition
No. 92-4010, 1993 Widener affirmed
WL 243692 (4th Cir. Hamilton
July 7, 1993)
Smith v. Dixon, 996 Sprouse author grant of sentencing-
F.2d 667 (4th Cir. Butzner majority phase relief and
1993), vacated on Wilkins concurring denial of other claims
reh 'g en bane, 14 in part; for relief affirmed;
F.3d 956 (4th Cir. dissenting
1994) in part
Pruett v. Thompson, Widener author denial of relief
996 F.2d 1560 (4th Russell unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1993) Hall
DeLong v. Thompson, Butzner author denial of petition
No. 92-4000, 1993 Hall unanimous affirmed
WL 24788 (4th Cir. Hamilton
Feb. 4, 1993)
Stamper v. Wright, Ervin per curiam denial of successive
No. 93-4000, 1993 Hamilton petition affirmed
WL 12492 (4th Cir. Butzner
Jan. 19, 1993)
Wise v. Williams, 982 Luttig author denial of relief
F.2d 142 (4th Cir. Hall unanimous affirmed
1992) Wilkinson
Jones v. Murray, 976 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 169 (4th Cir. Ervin unanimous affirmed
1992) Wilkinson
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Gardner v. Dixon, Hamilton author denial of relief
No. 91-4010, 1992 Russell unanimous affirmed
WL 119879 (4th Cir. Phillips
June 4, 1992)
Adams v. Aiken, 965 Butzner author denial of relief
F.2d 1306 (4th Cir. Sprouse unanimous affirmed
1992), vacated mem. Wilkins
sub nom. Adams v.
Evatt, 511 U.S. 1001
(1994)
Poyner v. Murray, Widener author denial of relief
964 F.2d 1404 (4th Russell unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1992) Hall
Spann v. Martin, 963 Chapman author grant of defendant's
F.2d 663 (4th Cir. Ervin unanimous request for dismissal
1992) Wilkins without prejudice
reversed
Williams v. Dixon, Ervin author denial of guilt-phase
961 F.2d 448 (4th Butzner majority relief affirmed; denial
Cir. 1992), abrogated Widener concurring of sentencing-phase
by Beard v. Banks, relief vacated
542 U.S. 406 (2004).
Washington v. Phillips author dismissal of IAC
Murray, 952 F.2d Wilkinson unanimous claim vacated and
1472 (4th Cir. 1991) Butzner remanded for
evidentiary hearing;
dismissal of all other
claims affirmed
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Bunch v. Thompson, Wilkinson author dismissal of petition
949 F.2d 1354 (4th Widener majority affirmed
Cir. 1991) Sprouse dissenting
Jones v. Murray, 947 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 1106 (4th Cir. Ervin unanimous affirmed
1991) Wilkinson
Gaskins v. Evatt, No. Phillips per curiam denial of successive
91-4009, 1991 WL Hamilton petition and motion
176144 (4th Cir. Chapman for stay of execution
Sept. 5, 1991) affirmed
Fitzgerald v. Wilkinson author dismissal of petition
Thompson, 943 F.2d Russell unanimous affirmed
463 (4th Cir. 1991) Chapman
Peterson v. Murray, Hall per curiam Grant of temporary
949 F.2d 704 (4th Sprouse stay of execution
Cir. 1991) Wilkinson vacated
Maynard v. Dixon, Phillips author dismissal of petition
943 F.2d 407 (4th Russell unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1991) Murnaghan
Stamper v. Muncie, Mumaghan author denial of relief
944 F.2d 170 (4th Ervin unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1991) Butzner
McDougall v. Dixon, Chapman author denial of relief
921 F.2d 518 (4th Phillips unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1990) Wilkins
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Gaskins v. McKellar, Phillips author dismissal of petition
916 F.2d 941 (4th Ervin unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1990) Chapman
Bassette v. Chapman author denial of relief
Thompson, 915 F.2d Ervin unanimous affirmed
932 (4th Cir. 1990) Wilkinson
Clozza v. Murray, Widener author denial of relief
913 F.2d 1092 (4th Hall unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1990) Wilkins
Peterson v. Murray, Sprouse author denial of relief
904 F.2d 882 (4th Hall unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1990) Wilkinson
Woomer v. Aiken, Mumaghan per curiam denial of relief and
Nos. 90-4002, 90- Chapman motion for stay of
4003, 1990 WL Wilkinson execution affirmed
74225 (4th Cir. Apr.
24, 1990)
Justus v. Murray, 897 Hall author denial of relief
F.2d 709 (4th Cir. Butzner unanimous affirmed
1990) Williams (E.D.
Va.)
Coleman v. Butzner author denial of relief
Thompson, 895 F.2d Chapman unanimous affirmed
139 (4th Cir. 1990) Merhige (E.D.
Va.)
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Grandison v. Murnaghan per curiam dismissal of petition
Warden, No. 89- Chapman without prejudice
4004, 1990 WL 2247 Michael (W.D. affirmed
(4th Cir. Jan. 12, Va.)
1990)
Boggs v. Bair, 892 Widener author grant of sentencing-
F.2d 1193 (4th Cir. Sprouse unanimous phase relief reversed;
1989) Dupree denial of guilt-phase
(E.D.N.C.) relief affirmed
Brown v. Dixon, 891 Ervin author grant of sentencing-
F.2d 490 (4th Cir. Russell unanimous phase relief reversed;
1989) Chapman denial of guilt-phase
relief affirmed; case
remanded for further
consideration
Giarratano v. Butzner author denial of relief
Procunier, 891 F.2d Hall unanimous affirmed
483 (4th Cir. 1989) Wilkins
Waye v. Murray, 884 Widener per curiam denial of relief
F.2d 765 (4th Cir. Wilkinson affirmed
1989) Wilkins
Waye v. Townley, 884 Widener per curiam denial of relief and
F.2d 762 (4th Cir. Wilkinson denial of stay of
1989) Wilkins execution affirmed
Evans v. Thompson, Wilkinson author denial of relief
881 F.2d 117 (4th Hall unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1989) Doumar (E.D.
Va.)
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Waye v. Townley, 871 Wilkins author dismissal of petition
F.2d 18 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
1989) Wilkinson
McDowell v. Dixon, Winter author denial of guilt-phase
858 F.2d 945 (4th Ervin unanimous relief reversed
Cir. 1988) Butzner
Woomer v. Aiken, Wilkins author denial of relief
856 F.2d 677 (4th Chapman unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1988) Wilkinson
Butler v. Aiken, 864 Hall author request for rehearing
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. Russell majority en banc of panel's
1988) Widener majority affirmance of district
Chapman majority court's denial of relief
Wilkinson majority denied
Wilkins majority
Winter dissenting
Phillips joined
Winter
Murnaghan joined
Winter
Sprouse joined
Winter
Ervin joined
Winter
Stockton v. Virginia, Wilkinson author denial of guilt-phase
852 F.2d 740 (4th Ervin majority relief and grant of
Cir. 1988) Widener concurring sentencing-phase
in part; relief affirmed
dissenting
in part
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Butler v. Aiken, 846 Hall author dismissal of petition
F.2d 255 (4th Cir. Russell unanimous affirmed
1988) Chapman
Clanton v. Bair, 826 Haynsworth author grant of sentencing-
F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. Hall unanimous phase relief reversed;
1987) Wilkinson denial of cross-appeal
affirmed
Hyman v. Aiken, 824 Butzner author denial of guilt-phase
F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. Russell concurring relief reversed
1987) in part;
dissenting
in part
Widener joined
Russell
Whitley v. Muncy, Winter per curiam denial of relief
823 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. Widener affirmed
1987) Sprouse
Whitley v. Bair, 802 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. Winter unanimous affirmed
1986) Sprouse
Rook v. Rice, No. 86- Hall per curiam denial of successive
4005, 1986 WL Phillips petition affirmed;
18624 (4th Cir. Sept. Haynsworth motion for stay of
16, 1986) execution denied
Rook v. Rice, 783 Hall author denial of relief
F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Haynsworth majority affirmed
1986) Phillips concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
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Clark v. Townley, Winter author grant of relief
791 F.2d 925 (4th Murnaghan unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1986) Ervin
(unpublished table
decision)
Roach v. Aiken, 781 Widener per curiam CPC denied; appeal
F.2d 379 (4th Cir. Ervin dismissed
1986) Sneeden
Hyman v. Aiken, 777 Butzner author denial of sentencing-
F.2d 938 (4th Cir. Russell unanimous phase relief
1985), vacated mem. Sneeden remanded; denial of
478 U.S. 1016 (1986) guilt-phase relief
affirmed
Smith v. Procunier, Mumaghan author denial of relief
769 F.2d 170 (4th Widener unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1985) Warriner (E.D.
Va.)
Roach v. Martin, 757 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. Ervin unanimous affirmed
1985) Sneeden
Turner v. Bass, 753 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 1238 (4th Cir. Hall majority affirmed
1985), rev'd sub nom. Phillips concurring
Turner v. Murray,
476 U.S. 28 (1986)
Briley v. Bass, 750 Wilkinson author denial of relief
F.2d 1238 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
1984) Phillips
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Mason v. Procunier, Hall per curiam denial of relief
748 F.2d 852 (4th Ervin affirmed
Cir. 1984) Butzner
Barfield v. Woodard, Phillips per curiam denial of relief
748 F.2d 844 (4th Mumaghan affirmed
Cir. 1984) Sprouse
Briley v. Booker, 746 Russell per curiam denial of relief
F.2d 225 (4th Cir. Widener affirmed
1984) Hall
Briley v. Bass, 742 Russell author denial of relief
F.2d 155 (4th Cir. Widener unanimous affirmed
1984) Hall
Keeten v. Garrison, Hall author grant of sentencing-
742 F.2d 129 (4th Russell majority phase relief reversed
Cir. 1984) Butzner concurring
in part;
dissenting
in part
Shaw v. Martin, 733 Widener author denial of relief
F.2d 304 (4th Cir. Phillips unanimous affirmed
1984) Sprouse
Hutchins v. Woodard, Mumaghan author CPC and motion for
730 F.2d 953 (4th Phillips concurring stay of execution
Cir. 1984) Sprouse concurring denied; petition for
habeas relief
dismissed
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Stamper v. Ervin author reversed and
Baskerville, 724 F.2d Butzner majority remanded to district
1106 (4th Cir. 1984) Mumaghan concurring court to dismiss for
defendant's failure to
exhaust claims
Hutchins v. Garrison, Murnaghan author denial of relief
724 F.2d 1425 (4th Russell unanimous affirmed
Cir. 1983) Sprouse
Barfield v. Harris, Haynsworth author denial of relief
719 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. Phillips unanimous affirmed
1983) Mumaghan
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